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I. PANDEMICS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE PANDEMICS OF THE 
MIND 
 
Where is international arbitration going, quo vadis? Since this is a question in 
Latin, let’s start with some Roman history. 
Procopius (500 AD/ (†) circa 562 AD) was a legal advisor to Belisarius, a 
general of Emperor Justinian, who reigned over the Eastern Roman Empire.1 He 
also was a prominent historian who, in parallel to writing the official history of 
the Empire, wrote what he called The Secret History, a chronicle not for the eyes 
of the Emperor or his entourage. In this book, Procopius describes the greed and 
cruelty of Justinian and the dissolute life of his wife, Theodora, and others close 
to ruling circles in Byzantium (after Constantinople and now Istanbul), the then 
Eastern Roman Empire capital.2 
Procopius’s book is not limited to describing the autocratic rule of Justinian 
(who reigned between 527 and 562 AD) and the moral decadence of those close 
to him, but also refers to the murderous pandemic that ravaged his empire in 
541–542 AD.3 This pandemic, probably a forerunner of the Black Death in the 
Middle Ages, accounted for perhaps millions of deaths, exterminated around 
forty percent of Byzantium’s population, and had successive comebacks until 
approximately 700 AD.4 The terrible plague did not spare anyone, irrespective 
of rank or wealth, and decimated the Roman legions protecting Byzantium and 
the Empire.5 
Recently, it has been persuasively argued that the pandemic was the decisive 
blow sounding the death knell to Byzantium and the Eastern Roman Empire, or 
at least precipitated their demise, since it destroyed the Empire’s economy, 
sowed death and despair in its population, and left its frontiers exposed to the 
onslaught of foreign enemies anxious to plunder Byzantium’s riches.6 
However, Justinian is better remembered not for his corruption and autocratic 
rule, but by his compilation of Roman law through the Corpus Iuris Civilis,7 
preserving the glorious legacy of Roman jurists for posterity despite the auto-
cratic influence of Justinian in the compilation to assert his monopoly on law-
 
 1 G.A. Williamson, Introduction to PROCOPIUS, THE  SECRET HISTORY 24–25 (1981). 
 2 See PROCOPIUS, THE SECRET HISTORY 68–113, 176–91 (1981). 
 3 PROCOPIUS, supra note 2, at 56; G.A. Williamson, supra note 1, at 25–26. 
 4 KYLE HARPER, THE FATE OF ROME 220–44 (2017). 
 5 Id. at 244–45. 
 6 Id. at 162–63. 
 7 Corpus Iuris Civilis, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge Library Collection, Clas-
sics, Latin language original) 2014. 
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making and legal interpretation.8  Nevertheless, the influence of Justinian’s Cor-
pus in both the common law and continental law systems is still noticeable today. 
Thus, the pandemic that destroyed lives and wealth could not annihilate the 
activity of the mind in the elaboration of the rule of law; nor the patient and 
conscientious work of Justinian’s jurists under the leadership of Tribonian9 and 
their lasting contributions to the progress and development of the law. 
Nevertheless, the operation of the mind is not always immune to a different 
type of pandemic. Pandemics are not only a menace to the lives of human beings, 
empires, or economic systems; but also, more difficult to grasp in the aggregate 
of their negative impacts, pandemics perversely influence human conduct, thus 
endangering cultural and ethical values on which human civilized existence is 
based. It is the mind that primarily suffers from this latter type of pandemic. Its 
virus easily propagates itself when human ideas and ensuing conduct are vitiated 
by irrational impulses or sheer ignorance. 
History—be it the history of pandemics destroying human life or the history 
of pandemics of the mind undermining the basis of human civilized existence—
again and again proves that failure to cauterize pandemics early leads to disaster 
and unimaginable human suffering. 
The rule of law—a cultural creation fashioning human conduct—is not free 
from the risks of this second type of pandemic. 
 
II. ARE THERE MIND PANDEMICS AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION? 
 
Against this backdrop, if we turn now our eyes to the field of international 
arbitration, we shall see that different and qualified voices have sent alarm sig-
nals by pointing to certain relatively recent and unfavorable developments con-
cerning its role and operation. 
We cannot so far equate the facts prompting such developments with a pan-
demic or perhaps even with a disease, but it would be reckless to ignore them nor 
not to send warning signals before the virus becomes widespread or out of con-
trol. 
For example, Judge James Crawford draws attention to certain aspects of in-
vestment dispute resolution mechanisms reflecting policies originated in the Eu-
ropean Union, which may conspire against the neutrality or diverse cultural and 
 
 8 JOHN P. DAWSON, ORACLES OF THE LAW 122–23 (1968). 
 9 Tribonian was a notable Byzantine jurist and advisor, who supervised the revision of 
the legal code of the Byzantine Empire, or Corpus Iuris Civilis, during the reign of Emperor 
Justinian. T. HONORÉ, TRIBONIAN (Duckworth, 1996). 
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expert background expected from adjudicators deciding investment disputes. 10  
Judge Crawford centers his analysis in part on provisions of the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Un-
ion.11 
According to CETA Article 8.27, the decision of investment disputes is en-
trusted to a permanent tribunal composed of fifteen members elected for five-
year terms renewable once (five Canadian nationals, five nationals from EU 
countries, and five from third countries).12 All tribunal members are appointed 
by the CETA Joint Committee, the members of which are in turn appointed pur-
suant to CETA Article 26.1 by the CETA member States.13 
Pursuant to CETA Article 8.28,14 all members of CETA’s Appellate Tribunal 
are also appointed by the CETA Joint Committee.15 Crawford points out that the 
fact that these tribunals shall only be composed of State-appointed individuals 
may compromise their independence.16 
Also, sociologically speaking, State-appointed persons to investment tribunals 
are often present or former government lawyers, prominent present or former 
State counsel or judges, which might conspire not only against the neutrality of 
decision makers but also against legal knowledge diversity needed for the reso-
lution of investment cases. Investment disputes require not only individuals—
not infrequently coming from academia—well-versed in public international law 
 
 10 James Crawford, The Ideal Arbitrator: Does One Size Fit All?, 32 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
1003, 1004 (2018). 
 11 Id. at 1014. 
 12 See Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement art. 8.27, Can.-E.U., Oct. 30, 
2016, O.J. (L 11) 23 [hereinafter CETA]. 
 13 See CETA, supra note 12, at art. 26.1. 
 14 See CETA, supra note 12, at art. 8.28. 
 15 The Kingdom of Belgium requested the opinion of the European Court of Justice on the 
compatibility of CETA Chapter Eight Section F on resolution of investment disputes between 
investors and states within the European Union Treaties. In its Opinion 1/17 on April 30, 2019, 
the European Court of Justice held that CETA Chapter Eight Section F “is compatible with 
EU primary law.” Case C-1/17, EU-Can. CET Agreement, ECLI:EU:C:2019:34, ¶ 245 (Apr. 
30, 2019) (emphasis added). At the time of writing this paper, CETA had been ratified by 
fourteen countries (including Canada, which has completed the ratification process). The thir-
teen EU Member States having ratified CETA are Austria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Esto-
nia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The 
European Parliament approved CETA on February 15, 2017 by 408 votes to 254, with 33 ab-
stentions. CETA: MEPs Back EU-Canada Trade Agreement, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: NEWS 
(Feb. 15, 2017, 12:41 PM), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20170209IP 
R61728/ceta-meps-back-eu-canada-trade-agreement. The dispute resolution system regarding 
foreign investment claims, including CETA’s appellate tribunal, will become effective upon 
full ratification of CETA. Commission Presents Procedural Proposals for the Investment 
Court System in CETA, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (Oct. 11, 2019), https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doc 
lib/press/index.cfm?id=2070. 
 16 Crawford, supra note 10, at 1021–22. 
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but also practitioners with expertise in commercial and economic legal issues as 
well as procedural case management skills. However, the requirement under Ar-
ticle 8.27 (4) of CETA, privileging the composition of CETA tribunals with pub-
lic international law experts, would exclude arbitrators with experience in com-
mercial arbitration and public law.17 In investment cases, the cross-fertilization 
of international, general business, and commercial law experience and case man-
agement skills positively contributes to the quality and evenhandedness of the 
dispute resolution process and its outcome.18 As summarized by Crawford, “In-
vestor-State arbitration is a relatively new phenomenon and, like all goods and 
services, it benefits from a free market of competing ideas. The investment court 
proposal risks marginalizing valuable ideas from different systems of law.”19 
Crawford also criticizes CETA Article 8.31 (3),20 allowing the States to rec-
ommend agreed interpretations of CETA provisions binding on CETA tribunals 
even in respect of ongoing cases. He points out the risk that CETA Tribunal 
members will prefer legal principles familiar or favorable to States, which may 
also conspire against impartiality safeguards, like disclosure requirements, found 
in every set of arbitration procedural rules.21 
By addressing issues similar to some of those raised by Crawford, Charles 
Brower and Jawad Ahmad have also voiced concerns in a recent article about the 
politicization of the appointment process under State influence for these tribunals 
and mention it as an example of State efforts to “repossess” investor-state arbi-
tration.22 
Further, considering Crawford’s remarks concerning CETA, one wonders if 
decisions of these tribunals may qualify as arbitral awards that are enforceable, 
for example, under legal regimes such as the 1958 New York Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Conven-
tion).23 However, CETA Article 8.41 (5)24 provides that these tribunals’ awards 
 
 17 CETA, supra note 12, at art. 8.27 (4). 
 18 Crawford, supra note 10, at 1016–21. This balanced evaluation of the real situation 
should be contrasted with those opinions automatically characterizing arbitral tribunals as “bi-
ased” because “an arbitrator serving in one of these tribunals is likely to be an international 
commercial lawyer who may serve as ‘judge’ one day and return as corporate counsel the 
next.” Bill Waren, Sen. Warren Speaks out Against TPP, FRIENDS EARTH ACTION (Apr. 28, 
2015), http://foeaction.org/blog/sen-warren-tpp. In fact, most of investment arbitration tribu-
nals are composed of professionals who exclusively arbitrate cases or seldom serve as counsel. 
 19 Crawford, supra note 10, at 1021. 
 20 CETA, supra note 12. 
 21 Crawford, supra note 10, at 1021. 
 22 Charles Brower & Jawad Ahmad, From the Two-Headed Nightingale to the Fifteen-
Headed Hydra: The Many Follies of the Proposed International Investment Court, 41 
FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 791, 793–98 (2018). 
 23 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, 1958, 21.3 U.S.T. 2517. 
 24 See CETA, supra note 12. 
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fulfill such Convention’s Article 1 requirement regarding commerciality of the 
transaction giving rise to the dispute.25 It seems that the very drafters of CETA 
were aware of this issue, since CETA Article 8.41 (4) provides that “[e]xecution 
of the award shall be governed by the laws concerning the execution of judg-
ments or awards in force where the execution is sought.”26 
According to this Article, if not “awards,” these tribunals’ decisions may still 
qualify as court judgments in national enforcement jurisdictions, i.e. in scenarios 
in which the New York Convention, exclusively dealing with arbitral awards, 
does not apply.27 Thus, if in doubt about the “commerciality” of CETA awards, 
they could still be enforced as judgments. 
Be that as it may, CETA Article 8.41 (4) highlights the ambiguous nature of 
the determinations of these tribunals. Since international arbitration is indisput-
ably based on the free selection of the members of the arbitral tribunal by the 
parties, and that such a fundamental right in arbitration is denied to the private 
investor under the CETA regime, it becomes more than doubtful that awards of 
these tribunals may be characterized as arbitral awards qualifying as such, inter 
alia, under the New York Convention, irrespective of whether the subject-matter 
of investment disputes are characterized as commercial. Is it possible to rule that 
an award or sentence is an arbitral award by an arbitrary command or ukase when 
the very constitution of the tribunal at stake is inimical to the most fundamental 
notions defining what arbitration is? 
In any event, CETA tribunals are a hybrid creation which, at the end of the 
day, is closer to a judicial adjudication system than to arbitration and, for that 
reason, they and their determinations cannot be safely branded as “arbitration 
tribunals” or “arbitral awards.” 
In his recent lecture at Washington College of Law’s Center on International 
Commercial Arbitration, Yves Fortier addresses some of the concerns regarding 
CETA and EU initiatives.28 These initiatives were subject to James Crawford’s 
 
 25  
When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention, or notifying exten-
sion under article X hereof, any State may on the basis of reciprocity declare 
that it will apply the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of 
awards made only in the territory of another Contracting State. It may also 
declare that it will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of 
legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as com-
mercial under the national law of the State making such declaration. 
New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. 
I (3), 1958, 21.3 U.S.T. 2517. 
 26 CETA, supra note 12, at 70. 
 27 Id. 
 28 The Honorable L. Yves Fortier, PC, CC, OQ, Long Live the Golden Summer: Arbitra-
tion Courts, & Colas 2019 Annual Lecture on International Commercial Arbitration American 
University Washington College of Law, DC, 9 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 313 (2020). 
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analysis in his lecture,29 but Fortier expands his considerations beyond the area 
of international investment dispute settlement by also addressing some of these 
issues from the perspective of international commercial arbitration. 
Yves Fortier raises his voice against those who predict or advocate the demise 
of international arbitration to resolve investment disputes or attempts to trans-
form arbitration into a hybrid, depriving arbitration of some of its basic charac-
teristics that account for its universal success and relentless expansion and ac-
ceptance.30 Like Crawford, Fortier points out that the impartiality and 
independence of permanent dispute resolution bodies, all of whose members are 
appointed by the State parties to the dispute, are questionable.31 
Specifically, Fortier refers to attempts to: (a) weaken the finality of arbitral 
awards by subjecting them to means of recourse on the merits (present already 
in the CETA provisions but advocated more generally by some in the field of 
commercial arbitration) and (b) substitute permanent courts or tribunals for arbi-
tral tribunals constituted by the will of the parties, already adopted by CETA.32  
In this latter respect, there is some proximity with proposals in the area of inter-
national commercial arbitration (also criticized by Fortier) to have all the mem-
bers of arbitral tribunals appointed by arbitral institutions rather than by the par-
ties to the dispute, which of course would deprive the parties of their fundamental 
right to participate in the constitution of the arbitral tribunal.33 However, the 
CETA regime is even more alien to the basic principle that arbitration is prem-
ised on party autonomy, since it provides that only the State party appoints those 
who will decide the dispute.34 
Nevertheless, the common denominator of such ideas is the notion that the 
independence and impartiality of international arbitrators are suspect or that the 
reliability of their findings and legal analysis is questionable. Although as far as 
the CETA appeal mechanism is concerned, the distrust for final arbitral determi-
nations is exclusively presented in the garb of allegations that an appeal tribunal 
would improve the consistency of awards or cure manifestly wrong decisions.35 
In the area of investment disputes, provisions such as those found in the CETA 
dispute settlement mechanisms36 respond to the idea that arbitral determinations 
have traditionally favored the private party rather than the State. However, as 
Fortier points out, such views are not supported by statistics of cases won or lost 
by the State.37 As far as appeals are concerned, and as Fortier emphasizes, there 
 
 29 See generally Crawford, supra note 10. 
 30 Fortier lecture, supra note 28 at 316–18. 
 31 Id. at 322. 
 32 Id. at 327–28. 
 33 Id. at 322–23. 
 34 CETA, supra note 12, at art. 8.27, 8.28; Fortier lecture, supra note 28, at 317, 319. 
 35 Fortier lecture, supra note 28, at 316–20. 
 36 See CETA, supra, note 12. 
 37 Fortier lecture, supra note 28, at 322–25. 
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is no guarantee that consistency will be assured at the appeal level absent adher-
ence to the stare decisis principle, which is neither provided for in CETA’s text 
nor is it a given in different proposals to subject commercial awards to review by 
a “superior” arbitral tribunal.38 
Further, the fact that different cases raising similar issues may be decided dif-
ferently is—as  Fortier indicates—normally the consequence of different fact and 
legal patterns requiring tailor-made solutions.39 On the other hand, experience 
shows that appellate courts also make mistakes.40 One of the virtues of arbitra-
tion, ensuring its enduring success, is precisely the diversity of arbitral solutions 
adapted to the various factual and legal backgrounds giving rise to the dispute. 
On the other hand, finality has been one of the traditional advantages of arbitral 
adjudication attracting arbitration users and, as Fortier asserts, there is no valid 
reason for it not to remain one of the hallmarks of arbitration.41 
Finally, removing the right of any party to participate in the constitution of the 
arbitral tribunal, either in the field of investment or of commercial arbitration, 
conspires against one of the most fundamental bases of arbitration: the ability to 
name at least one of the persons who shall adjudicate the dispute.42 
In his recent speech delivered on the occasion of his admission as member to 
the Spanish Real Academia de Jurisprudencia y Legislación, Bernardo Cremades 
also points to developments raising similar concerns.43 Cremades looks at some 
of the criticisms raised against international arbitration, questioning its ability to 
provide solutions for commercial and economic disputes based on the rule of 
law.44 His reply is that arbitration in the present globalized world is the right 
dispute resolution mechanism to address and resolve such disputes by application 
of the rule of law in ways adapted to the particular characteristics of this kind of 
dispute arising out in a globalized context.45 A reason for this is that international 
arbitral adjudication is premised on the elaboration of procedural and substantive 
legal solutions for such disputes from a perspective to be differentiated from the 
mental approach of jurists only used to dealing with disputes within the bounda-
ries of their national jurisdiction.46 
 
 38 Id. at 326–27. 
 39 Id. at 322. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 322. 
 43 Bernardo M. Cremades, Speech at Real Academia de Jurisprudencia y Legislación: El 
Arbitraje Internacional en la Encrucijada de la Critica (Mar.19, 2018). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
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In that connection, Cremades refers to the seminal contribution of the 1869–
1872 Alabama Claims ad-hoc arbitration47 in which the arbitral tribunal, includ-
ing British and U.S. arbitrators, resolved a dispute alleging a British violation of 
the laws of neutrality by repairing in Great Britain ships utilized in the Secession 
War to destroy commercial ships of the North.  Cremades points out that the 
ensuing award against Great Britain, then the most powerful nation in the World, 
not only put an end to this dispute but opened the path to the cooperation between 
Great Britain and the USA that is still present today.48 The Alabama arbitration 
eloquently shows the role played by international arbitration since its first devel-
opments in providing solutions specifically adapted to international disputes 
(which of course is not the same if the resolution of these kinds of disputes were 
rooted in a parochial setting), as well as in restoring a peaceful environment for 
the future interaction between the parties once the dispute has been settled. 
Cremades then addresses the political and ideological sources of many of the 
attacks against international arbitration for the settlement of investment dis-
putes.49 He indicates that such attacks respond to precipitated and demagogic 
attempts originated from the European Union questioning arbitral decision-mak-
ing in connection with investment disputes.50 Cremades contends that rather than 
specifically going to the root of the problem apparently prompting such attacks, 
which is the open-textured nature of the substantive protection provisions in in-
vestment protection treaties, the attacks are primarily targeted at the supposed 
lack of neutrality of the arbitral dispute resolution system in such treaties viewed 
with the distorted lens of political and ideological agendas.51 
Cremades situates the origin of these attacks on international arbitration in the 
nationalistic trends in the Americas, Europe, and Asia since the inception of the 
twenty-first century, having the effect of undermining legal instruments seeking 
to fashion global solutions for global problems.52 It is within the context of this 
paradoxical political situation—since the exacerbation of nationalism runs 
against the solution of global problems from a global perspective in a world ir-
reversibly globalized—that anti-arbitration attacks need to be understood and 
dealt with.53 
Cremades points out that this general trend accounts for the European Un-
ion/Canada CETA treaty investment dispute resolution provisions mentioned 
above.54 According to Cremades, the European Union’s bureaucratic efforts to 
set up permanent tribunals to resolve investment disputes has been echoed by a 
 
 47 Text of this decision in G. Wetter I The International Arbitral Process 48–56 (1979). 
 48 Cremades, supra note 43, at 27. 
 49 Id. at 98–100. 
 50 Id. at 112. 
 51 Id. at 52. 
 52 Id. at 109–11. 
 53 Id. at 93–96. 
 54 Id. at 116. 
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politicization of exchanges regarding foreign investment international dispute 
resolution at the level of serious technical institutions such as the United Nations 
Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL).55 Such developments 
have  disrupted the consensus normally reached during the last fifty years in the 
elaboration of model rules in international arbitration and international trade and 
economic matters, which have been generally free from political or ideological 
constraints.56 
Brower and Ahmad also point out in their paper to unequivocal signs of polit-
icization in the July 2017 UNCITRAL Working Group III meeting addressing 
ISDS reform premised on the creation of multilateral permanent adjudicatory 
bodies for the decision of investment disputes.57 
As Cremades properly states, these developments and political maneuverings 
are witnessed with perplexity by practitioners and adjudicators actually involved 
in the determination of commercial and economic disputes through international 
arbitration.58 These actors are surprised to see their dispute settling activity, 
based on the identification and application of the rule of law, considered instead 
from the perspective of competing ideologies or political agendas.59 
 
III. CLOSING THOUGHTS 
 
The following thoughts are prompted by the above considerations. 
Misinformation about the role of international arbitration or preconceived ide-
ological or irrational visions of how the arbitration process actually works or 
should work—sometimes disseminated by the non-specialized media—are ma-
jor components of negative attitudes regarding international arbitration. 
An eloquent example is the experience recounted by Crawford during his lec-
ture at the Washington College of Law mentioned before.60 He was one of the 
three members of the Arbitral Tribunal that decided Philip Morris’s BIT claims 
against Uruguay.61 When the members of the Arbitral Tribunal were appointed 
 
 55 Id. at 116. 
 56 Cremades, supra note 43, at 96. 
 57 Brower & Ahmad, supra note 22, at 812–14. 
 58 Cremades, supra note 43, at 115. 
 59 Id. 
 60 From my notes when listening to the Washington College of Law Crawford lecture, 
which was the basis for his article. James Crawford, The Ideal Arbitrator: Does One Size Fit 
All?, 32 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2018). 
 61 Philip Morris Brands Sàrl, Philip Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. 
Oriental Republic of Uruguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, formerly FTR Holding SA, Philip 
Morris Products S.A. and Abal Hermanos S.A. v. Oriental Republic of Uruguay, (July 8, 
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(and before the case was heard), certain English press proclaimed that this was 
another example of a biased tribunal that would decide the case in favor of the 
investors and to the detriment of the powers of the State to regulate tobacco con-
sumption in order to protect the health of its population.  But when the Arbitral 
Tribunal rendered its final award in favor of Uruguay, the same press, without 
rectifying its former negative views about the Arbitral Tribunal’s integrity, said 
that, after all, no other solution was possible since the case made by Uruguay 
was so strong that the arbitrators did not have any option but to decide in favor 
of Uruguay. 
The clear implication is that arbitral adjudication is always unreliable, even 
when the arbitrators get it right.   
Part of the problem is that, semantically, the term “arbitration” has different 
meanings depending on the role of arbitration and the specific scenario in which 
it is called to operate. Failure to understand such role and scenario may lead the 
unaware to reach wrong conclusions as to the usefulness and virtues of arbitra-
tion. For example, it is not appropriate to extend to international arbitration crit-
icisms addressed to the actual or assumed role that arbitration has or may have 
in strictly domestic contexts or in connection with consumer protection, labor 
contracts, or labor disputes.62 
Another part of the problem, also mentioned by Cremades but worthy of being 
emphasized again, is extending to arbitration criticisms actually aimed at the 
standards of substantive protection provided in BITs.63 As set forth in a seminal 
article by Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez and William “Rusty” Park, although in 
matter of such standards, “[c]larification and adjustment may be in order . . . it 
would be fundamentally unsound to call into question the use of neutral binding 
arbitration itself as the preferred means for resolving cross-border investment 
disputes.”64 
Not infrequently, public criticism of international arbitration originates in the 
frustration felt by those who are on the losing end in arbitration cases they were 
 
2016), ICSID final arbitral award by an arbitral tribunal composed of Piero Bernardini, Gary 
Born (dissenting in part) and James Crawford. 
 62 See generally Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, 
Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES: BEWARE THE FINE PRINT (Oct. 31, 2015), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-
the-deck-of-justice.html (explanatory parenthetical); see also Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Mi-
chael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System’, N.Y. TIMES: BEWARE 
THE FINE PRINT (Nov. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-
arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html (despite the incendiary titles, the authors 
exclusively deal with arbitration of labor or consumer disputes in a domestic USA setting, i.e, 
totally unrelated to arbitration of international commercial, economic or investment disputes 
involving the sophisticated players usually participating in the resolution of such disputes). 
 63 Cremades, supra note 43, at 118. 
 64 Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment Arbitra-
tion: NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 398 (2003). 
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a party to. When I was ICC Court Secretary General, I remember meeting with 
a disgruntled and important California businessman claiming for the modifica-
tion of the ICC arbitration rules in order to create an appeal body for reviewing 
arbitral awards on the merits. It was not difficult to realize that he was not aiming 
at the general improvement of the ICC arbitral adjudication process but, rather, 
at voicing his own personal discomfort because he was not the winning party in 
an arbitral case in which he was involved, without objectively detailing the flaws 
in the procedure or in the arbitral decision-making process supposedly account-
ing for his failure to win. 
Although the examples given so far are essentially in the area of investment 
arbitration, one should not underestimate other negative expressions in the com-
mercial arbitration field. These are signs of a wider trend, surprisingly reaching 
out even to national jurisdictions historically favorable to international arbitra-
tion, according to which the traditional role of arbitration in the elaboration of 
specific solutions tailor-made to the particular characteristics of the case at stake, 
without stare decisis constraints and with minimum review of arbitral determi-
nations, is questioned. 
The controversial nature of some of these trends is significantly confirmed by 
the fact that they may be subject to pendular oscillations. 
An illustration of this is the 2016 lecture delivered by the Lord Chief Justice 
of England and Wales.65 After criticizing the test for granting appeals against 
arbitral awards under Section 69 of the 1996 Arbitration Act for England, Wales, 
and Northern Ireland  (1996 Act), the lecturer advocated for recovering the elab-
oration of the Common Law to the court system, that may be undermined by 
arbitral decisions on commercial matters maintained confidential and shielded 
from court review or court determination.66 Perhaps not without nostalgia for the 
much more extended powers vested in the judiciary to settle legal issues under 
the special, case-stated mechanism provided for in the 1950 Act, the lecturer 
centers his criticism on the test set forth in Section 69 of the Arbitration Act and 
the application of the determination of preliminary point of law mechanism un-
der Section 45 of the 1996 Act.67 In his own words: 
My view is clear. In retrospect the U.K. went too far in 1979 and 
again in 1996 in favouring the perceived advantages for arbitra-
tion as a means of dispute resolution in London over the devel-
opment of the common law; the time is right to look again at the 
 
 65 The Right Hon. The Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, Lord Chief Justice of England and 
Wales, The Bailii Lecture 2016: Developing Commercial Law Through the Courts: Rebalanc-
ing the Relationship Between the Courts and Arbitration (Mar. 9, 2016), para. 48, at 17, judicia 
ry.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/lcj-bailli-lecture-20160309.pdf. 
 66 Id. para. 5 at 2. 
 67 Id. at ¶¶ 19–23. 
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balance. There is also a need to examine whether . . . to waive 
arbitration in cases where there were significant points of general 
interest and to appreciate that not only would their own dispute, 
in the right case involving legal issues, be better determined in a 
court but, more importantly, the wider interests of their industry 
and of the common law in general would be much better served 
by more issues being resolved in court and the law thus developed 
and clarified. 68 
However, in his lecture on May 1, 2018, his successor had a much more bal-
anced approach in regard to similar issues.69 After indicating that he “part[ed] 
company” in respect of his predecessor’s view that the gateway for appeals 
against arbitral determinations should be widened70 (he also warned against in-
volving in a “zero-sum” game in which a so-called gain for arbitration means 
corresponding loss for the courts and vice versa), Lord Justice Gross stated that 
“I am afraid that I simply do not see the relationship between the courts and 
arbitration in these terms.”71 
In this vein, he emphasized the importance assigned to private autonomy and 
choice on which arbitration thrives.72 In unequivocal terms, he asserted that “an-
alytically, those who choose private dispute resolution wish to resolve their dis-
putes; that is their legitimate individual free choice and it is a matter of party 
autonomy. They owe no duty, moral, legal or otherwise, to encourage (and fund) 
appeals so as to develop the law.”73 In consonance with such objective, he char-
acterized controls under Section 69 of the 1996 Act, as a “tolerant and light touch 
statutory supervisory regime.”74 
He also situated the issues raised by Lord Chief Justice Thomas in a context 
both attuned to the advantages of international commercial arbitration, free from 
asphyxiating controls by the courts, and the wider interests of preserving London 
as an international arbitration center underlying the passing of the 1996 Act: 
Pulling the threads together, I do not see the courts and arbitration 
as engaged in a competition for work. I see the strength of Legal 
UK augmented by a strong court reinforcing thriving London ar-
 
 68 Id. at para. 48. 
 69 Lord Justice Peter Gross, The Jonathan Hirst QC Commercial Law Lecture: Courts and 
Arbitration (May 1, 2018), https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/speech-by-
lj-gross-hirst-lecture-distribution-may-2018.pdf. 
 70 Id. at para. 21. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at para. 6. 
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bitration, with London arbitration in turn increasing the attrac-
tions of English Law and thus, ultimately, the English Courts. As 
I have said before, this is a mutually supportive relationship. The 
strength of one supports the strength of the other and vice versa. 
The attractions of arbitration will not be enhanced by some sort 
of UDI from State Courts. 75 
Finally, he concluded that: 
[T]he place of international arbitration in global dispute resolu-
tion is secure. At its most basic, it fills the essential need of 
providing a neutral forum, with appropriate expertise, for the res-
olution of international commercial disputes, without requiring 
either party to agree to the other’s court jurisdiction. From the 
vantage point of Legal UK, the preservation and strengthening of 
London’s world-leading position as an arbitration centre or hub, 
is a matter of the highest importance.76 
It is of course desirable that the pendulum stops there: gusts of fresh air such 
as this are always welcome and reassuring. 
Nevertheless, this is not necessarily always the case, particularly when some 
of the developments described so far are prompted by broader political or ideo-
logical considerations which become more patent in the area of international dis-
pute resolution of investment disputes, as identified in Cremades’s paper.77 Some 
of such developments are intertwined with the expansion of nationalistic or hy-
per-nationalistic political trends in the world, not infrequently led by authoritar-
ian governments. 
Indeed, an exacerbation of these trends could become a pandemic menace to 
arbitration itself, international or domestic, and not just to investment arbitration. 
Such would have been the case if dictatorial regimes, such as those in fascist 
Italy and in Nazi Germany, premised on the notion of totaler Staat (totalitarian 
State),78 which did not leave any room for the expression of human individuality, 
 
 75 Id. at para. 22 (citations omitted). 
 76 Lord Justice Peter Gross, The Jonathan Hirst QC Commercial Law Lecture: Courts and 
Arbitration (May 1, 2018), at para. 35. 
 77 Cremades, supra note 43, at 109–16. 
 78 HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 303 (Ander Wedberg trans., Har-
vard Univ. Press ed. 1945). 
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including consent-based arbitration, or a foreign policy based on a peaceful ap-
proach to international relations79 prevailed.80 Democracy and arbitration go to-
gether. As Cremades underlines in his paper, the arrival of democracy in Spain 
brought about the end of State jurisdictional monopoly and opened the doors to 
arbitration as an expression of the free will of the parties.81 
The situation today is not the one in Italy and Germany in the 1923–1945 pe-
riod. However, looking back to history is always worthwhile lest history repeats 
itself. 
Further, there is room for optimism. 
Quoting from Gary Born, Fortier concludes at the end of his paper that the 
survival of arbitration depends on its five “E’s”: “efficiency, expedition, exper-
tise, even-handedness, and enforceability.”82 These benefits, present today, ac-
count for international arbitration’s undisputed success. 
 
 79 Such was already the foreign policy atmosphere present in the pre-Second World War 
years, with reverberations adverse to international means of dispute resolution, including in-
ternational arbitration. As eloquently described in a 1938 book on the history of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce and its contributions to world peace with words resonating still 
today: 
The significance of breakdowns in the sphere of foreign policy is more dif-
ficult to estimate than that of ordinary political breakdowns, due to the mul-
tiplicity and vast spread of the affected interests. Common action having 
collapsed, the parties resume their individual freedom of action. The failure 
of collective action foreshadows self-help, with or without mutual consent. 
GEORGE RIDGEWAY, MERCHANTS OF PEACE 372–73 (Columbia Univ. Press 1938) [hereinafter 
RIDGEWAY]. 
 80 Nevertheless, despite those negative developments, the resilience of international com-
mercial arbitration should be noted, as proven by the history of the International Court of 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC Court) headquartered in Paris, 
France. The President of the ICC Court during the war period was a Swedish national, Algot 
Bagge. Between 1940 and 1943 there were two ICC Courts, one sitting in Stockholm and the 
other in Paris, although all claims were filed in Stockholm. Between 1943 and 1945, the ICC 
Court merged into one, but kept holding meetings in both capitals. During the war period, 
nineteen international cases were registered, including a 1941 case involving French and Ger-
man parties. The first session during the war period was held on April 18, 1940 in Stockholm. 
The cases discussed by the ICC Court in that session involved parties from Italy, Germany, 
Switzerland, Austria, and Belgium (photocopies of correspondence and records from archives 
at the ICC Court Paris headquarters on file with the author). Thus, parties of the then two 
fascist countries accepted international arbitration. Already during the interregnum between 
the two World Wars the International Chamber of Commerce made substantive efforts to 
maintain World peace through, inter alia, its ICC Court international commercial dispute res-
olution services aimed at overcoming the “ominous times” and the “successive crises of the 
postwar period” announcing the Second World War. RIDGEWAY, supra note 79, at 317–31. 
 81 Cremades, supra note 43, at 12–13. 
 82 See Yves Fortier, International Arbitrator and Former Permanent Representative of 
Canada to the United Nations, Long Live the Golden Summer: Arbitration, Litigation, and 
Cola, 2019 Annual Lecture at American University Washington College of Law Center on 
International Arbitration (Oct. 19, 2019), https://www.wcl.american.edu/impact/initiatives-
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As Fortier also says, “Even well-intentioned attempts to correct perceived 
flaws with arbitration jeopardize these proven benefits.”83 
It is to be hoped that such attempts, well intentioned or not, many of which 
seem to echo prejudice or ideological or political interests, will go away without 
lasting damaging effects for international arbitration and the rule of law. 
Paraphrasing Pierre Lalive,84 let us not mistake the passing breezes of fashion 




for-investment-arbitration, at 12–14. This is a reference to the transcript of the recorded ver-
sion of the lecture not included in the text of the article referred to in note 28 above. 
 83 Id. at 33–34. 
 84 From my notes from the oral participation of Pierre Lalive in a seminar held in Geneva, 
Switzerland in 1999 under the auspices of the ICC International Commercial Arbitration on 
the then new ICC Arbitration Rules of 1998. 
